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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK			
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3	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Criminal			
4	) No. 15-252 (PKC) Government, ) ) MOTION HEARING			
5	vs. ) Brooklyn, New York			
6	JEFFREY WEBB, et al., ) Date: April 6, 2017 ) Time: 10:00 a.m.			
7	Defendants. )			
8	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING			
9	HELD BEFORE THE HONORABLE JUDGE PAMELA K. CHEN			
10	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
11	APPEARANCES			
12				
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19	(Appearances continued on next page)			
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21	Proceedings reported by machine shorthand, transcript produced by computer-aided transcription.			
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23	Court Reporter: Annette M. Montalvo, CSR, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter			
24	United States Courthouse, Room N375 225 Cadman Plaza East			
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3 (WHEREUPON, commencing at 10:12 a.m., the following 1 2 proceedings were had in open court, to wit:) 3 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Criminal cause for motion hearing, Docket 15-CR-252, United States v. Webb, et al. 4 Will the parties please state their appearances for 5 the record. 6 7 MR. NITZE: Sam Nitze, Kristin Mace, and Keith 8 Edelman for the United States. Good morning, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Good morning. 10 MR. PAPPALARDO: John Pappalardo and Silvia Piñera-Vazquez for Mr. Napout. 11 THE COURT: Good morning. Nice to see you again. 12 13 MR. STILLMAN: Good morning. Charles Stillman, Jim 14 Mitchell, and Julio Barbosa for Mr. Marin. 15 THE COURT: Good morning. Good to see you again. 16 MR. UDOLF: Good morning, Your Honor. Bruce Udolf 17 on behalf of Mr. Manuel Burga. 18 MR. MIEDEL: Good morning, Your Honor. Florian 19 Miedel on behalf of Hector Trujillo. My cocounsel Joshua 20 Paulson will be here in just a couple minutes. 21 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. MEHLER: Good morning. Gordon Mehler on behalf 22 23 of Costas Takkas, who is here. 24 THE COURT: Good morning to you, and to you, 25 Mr. Takkas.

All right. So as everyone knows, we are here for oral argument on a couple of different motions, primarily five of the defendants, all five defendants' severance motions, and then also Mr. Napout's speedy trial motion.

Before we start, I have been asked by the court reporter to remind all defense counsel to reidentify yourself every time you stand up because there's so many of you, it will be impossible for her to keep track of who's speaking in that moment.

Now, let me just set the stage a little bit, having obviously read all of the papers. Four of the five defendants are seeking to sever his trial from the other defendants, and then Defendant Takkas is also seeking to sever not only his trial from the other defendants, but also his trial on the RICO conspiracy charge from the money laundering and wire -- the wire and money laundering conspiracy charges against him.

And as I said before, Defendant Napout is also seeking a speedy trial or speedy trial relief, I presume namely to have his trial as soon as possible.

Now, I am going to give all the parties an opportunity to speak and to make all the arguments you want, but I want you to understand that as I see it, all of these severance motions coalesce around the same principles, the same legal principles and much of the same case law. And they're really identical in kind, though different in

specifics. To me, they are variations on a theme, to put it simply. So I want you to avoid rehashing arguments made by your cocounsel, especially about core legal principles, such as prejudicial spillover, antagonistic defenses, or anything in that nature. Rest assured, I am aware of the case law, you've cited it in your briefs, and you should focus your arguments on the specifics relating to your particular client.

I know that many of you have made the argument that the evidence that will be produced as to your particular client is dwarfed by the evidence that will be produced in relation to other defendants. So try to be as specific as possible.

Now, I see, and I want to tee this up for everybody, the largely determinative issue to be, with respect to the severance motions, and I have to be honest, I don't think it was sufficiently addressed, at least to my mind, by the defendants, even in their reply papers. It's the argument, obviously, that the government makes, which is that every defendant is charged in this RICO conspiracy. And it is pretty much black letter law that the government is entitled to put in evidence to prove that conspiracy, which could entail evidence that doesn't relate directly to conduct committed by an individual defendant.

So in that regard, I want to read for you a section from *US v. DiNome*, D-i-N-o-m-e, Second Circuit case, I know

6 that you are all familiar with, from 1992, 954 F.2d 839. 1 specifically, I am reading a very short passage from page 843 2 3 in the reported decision. 4 And there the Second Circuit noted, and I think this, for me, is the central issue that the defense has to 5 deal with, and it is certainly at the heart of the 6 7 government's opposition to severance. The Second Circuit says: We note here that the government must prove an 8 9 enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity as elements 10 of a RICO violation. It then, of course, cites 18 USC 11 1962(c). 12 Come on in. Is this your cocounsel, Mr. Miedel? 13 MR. MIEDEL: Yes. 14 THE COURT: Okay. Let's pause for a moment. Please state your name for the record. 15 16 MR. PAULSON: Joshua Paulson. 17 THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Paulson. Have a seat. 18 MR. PAULSON: My apologies for being late. 19 THE COURT: As I have advised all the other counsel, if you stand up to speak, just identify yourself for the court 20 21 reporter so she can keep track of everyone. 22 So then *DiNome* goes on to say: Proof of these 23 elements, namely the RICO violation, may well entail evidence 24 of each -- I'm sorry, may well entail evidence of numerous 25 criminal acts by a variety of persons, and each defendant in a

RICO case may reasonably claim no direct participation in some of those acts. Nevertheless, evidence of those acts is relevant to the RICO charges against each defendant, and the claim that separate trials would eliminate the so-called spillover prejudice is at least overstated, if not entirely meritless.

That is your task on the defense side, is to distinguish that general proposition, because that is a situation that all of you face here. All five defendants, as you know, are charged in one overarching RICO conspiracy. And, thus, the government, although I don't necessarily agree with how far that principle can always go, but the government certainly is entitled, if not required, to introduce evidence to establish both the enterprise and the pattern of racketeering activity.

I agree with the defense that the scope of how much information can come in in that regard has to be reasonably limited, so as to not to create prejudice to the defendants. But how do you justify separating yourselves from the other four defendants, if there is such a RICO conspiracy, and if at every trial on this RICO conspiracy charge the government is allowed to introduce evidence of a pattern of racketeering, which could well entail evidence about crimes in which your client was not involved?

So I would like you to focus on that, and explain to

me how you can overcome that general principle. And, obviously, everything else you want to argue.

Now, unless the defense counsel has agreed upon an order of argument, here's the one that I would like to follow. I would like to start with the attorneys for Mr. Trujillo, followed by the attorneys for Mr. Marin, next Defendant Burga, in part because he joined in Defendant Marin's motion, as well as added some supplemental argument, to be followed by the attorney for Mr. Takkas, who, as I mentioned, is the only one who's seeking to sever not only as to the other defendants, but also as to his individual counts from the RICO count. And then last, but not least, the attorneys for Mr. Napout, because they are arguing not only severance, but also speedy trial.

So unless that upsets an agreement that you all have, that's how I would like to proceed, and I think that will help me keep my briefs separate as well.

All right. So with that, Mr. Miedel or Mr. Paulson?

MR. PAULSON: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. Joshua

Paulson for Mr. Hector Trujillo.

Judge, without, of course, rehashing everything that's been in the briefs, I do want to simply point out that we've been watching the RICO statute for years being pushed further and further from the original purpose it had of prosecuting organized crime within the United States. And

we've never seen something quite like this, I don't think.

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The point that I think we've all raised in the briefs isn't to try to seek dismissal of RICO at this stage, because this is a fact based problem that I think will be determined at trial, and I think we can probably reasonably anticipate a number of Rule 29s on this issue at trial. However, we believe that particularly with respect to Mr. Trujillo, the government is using the RICO charge to simply get around Rule 403. We submitted a couple of cases to that point in our brief, particularly the reply. But the question really isn't whether or not the government is technically allowed to introduce evidence of the larger RICO conspiracy against Mr. Trujillo, it is how much of that would they be allowed to introduce if the trials were severed or, for example, as a hypothetical thought experiment, if Mr. Trujillo were the last defendant standing, what RICO evidence of CONMEBOL would the government be introducing at his trial. We submit that it would be very little, if any, at all.

They're arguing a very substantial international conspiracy over many years. To connect it to Mr. Trujillo, they really only need to introduce the fact that there was a conspiracy of which he was a part. They have not alleged any association whatsoever between Mr. Trujillo and the CONMEBOL conspiracy, the CONMEBOL defendants, and that's going to be

the bulk of this joint trial.

We may have weeks or months of listening to hundreds of hours of recordings, millions of pages of documents, that simply have nothing to do with Mr. Trujillo. The evidence against him is very limited. It is concise, there are, I believe, four or five documents, total, that the government submitted with respect to its bill of particulars that are tainted documentally to Mr. Trujillo. The conspiracies of which he is alleged to be a part are simply very, very limited and completely unrelated to those of the remaining defendants.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question, in the vein of a thought experiment. Let's imagine Mr. Trujillo's just going to trial by himself, as you posit. What evidence of the RICO conspiracy would you think is both sufficient and not overly prejudicial or overly broad?

MR. PAULSON: If the government wished to introduce limited evidence that the conspiracy extended throughout South America, they could certainly do that. They could do that without introducing millions of pages of documents. They could probably do it with one or two witnesses over the course of a couple of hours. Likewise --

THE COURT: Some summary witnesses? Some kind of summary witness?

MR. PAULSON: Yes, Your Honor. And they could certainly introduce the facts from their cooperators from

Traffic, Media World, whichever these other organizations are that were involved in some kind of larger aspect of the conspiracies, but it wouldn't take us months, Your Honor, it would take us a day or two.

The evidence that they have related to the CONCACAF conspiracies, the World Cup qualifying matches, which would be much more relevant to their case against Mr. Trujillo, would certainly be allowable, and that still goes beyond Mr. Trujillo's direct participation because he had nothing to do with CONCACAF. However, it puts his facts within that larger scope of the supposed RICO conspiracy. But, again, we are talking about a very limited number of hours of RICO evidence outside of the specific conspiracy that he's alleged to be a part of.

THE COURT: Okay. Continue. I didn't mean to interrupt you.

MR. PAULSON: Those are the primary points,
Your Honor, unless Your Honor has additional questions. But
we simply feel that the scope of Mr. Trujillo's alleged
participation is really such that his trial is going to be
completely consumed by evidence, which if he were tried
separately, would not be admissible under Rule 403 because it
would be cumulative, it would be prejudicial, and the simple
fact that he's charged as part of the same RICO conspiracy
would not allow him in a separate trial to sit through

12 hundreds of hours of evidence against the CONMEBOL defendants. 1 2 That can be established much more concisely, much more 3 briefly, and saving judicial economy. 4 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much. Next we have the attorneys for Mr. Stillman. Yes? 5 MR. STILLMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Good morning. 6 7 THE COURT: Good morning. 8 MR. STILLMAN: I guess if I could put on 9 Mr. Paulson's glasses and change my hair, I could get up and 10 say kind of the same things that he was just saying to you, Your Honor. 11 12 THE COURT: No facelift needed, or whatever it is 13 you are envisioning. 14 (Laughter.) MR. STILLMAN: I'll have to defend the ground that I 15 16 am stuck with. But, Your Honor, in your opinion denying our motion 17 18 to dismiss, you said the global conspiracy alleged in Count 1, 19 I think I got it right in my notes here, has a different scope 20 and different objectives than the conspiracies alleged in the 21 other counts of the indictment, and you went on to say, 22 therefore, it is not duplicitous. It was a duplicity 23 argument. 24 But what I am concentrating this morning on, 25 Your Honor, is the notion of just that very point, that the

global conspiracy, the global RICO, I will call it the global RICO conspiracy, has a different scope. We know that, it is decades of proof, it's taken 236 pages to spell it all out. And then when you talk -- when you speak of the different objectives in the smaller conspiracy, well, here we know that if you go through this indictment and through this RICO, there's 99 crimes, 38 conspiracies, I don't know what the number of defendants are, because of the original indictment and the second indictment, the unnamed coconspirators, there's an army of people whom they say are part of this RICO conspiracy.

And the case law, and Your Honor obviously points out an important case, Second Circuit case, and the Eastern District has been the fount of a lot of cases in this area, from *Upton* to *Gallo*, I am sure Your Honor knows them all. And yet when you look at the cases cited -- I have it right here. Just give me one split second, Judge. *Upton*.

So in *Upton*, you know, your colleague Judge Glasser -- it was not RICO, okay, it was conspiracy, but, nevertheless, he was confronted with this same kind of situation. And what Judge Glasser saw was that with respect to at least two of the defendants, they just didn't belong. It wasn't right to put them into the bigger case, and he severed them. You know, the judge granted the motion to sever, and others tried to get out, and he said, "No, you

can't get out." And I think that this really is a kind of a carry-on, if you will, from what my colleague Mr. Paulson was talking about.

Your Honor asked him what would happen if this case was United States v. Jose Maria Marin, everybody else had disappeared, and I am not saying anything other than they are not there. And I know I can say the same thing, they may get up and argue with me about it --

THE COURT: Under my rules they can't do that.

MR. STILLMAN: That's good.

To a moral certainty, the trial of United States v. Jose Maria Marin on this very same indictment would be a much shorter, smaller, tighter, their view of RICO would be a narrower view of what this RICO thing was, that if we go to this joint trial and Marin is not separated, he's going to be confronted with sitting day after day of evidence having nothing to do with him. Granted, it has to do with the RICO conspiracy, I get that. But the spillover, may not be the word that the Circuit likes, but there will be spillover. There will be harm to him, and we can eliminate that harm by a separate trial.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question, since you are the first of the three CONMEBOL defendants who are remaining. I don't understand how you can argue that you should be severed from the other two CONMEBOL defendants, at a

15 1 minimum, because you are all charged -- they are all charged 2 with the same smaller subconspiracy, if you will, relating to 3 the Copa America Centenario, and also the Copa Libertadores 4 scheme, too. So as to the other two defendants, Mr. Napout and 5 6 Mr. Burga, do you really have any kind of a severance 7 argument? 8 MR. STILLMAN: No. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Now you are just arguing as to 10 Mr. Trujillo and also then Mr. -- oh, no, I guess that would be it, just to Mr. Trujillo, really. 11 12 I appreciate that. So, basically, your Okay. 13 argument is similar, which is that all the RICO related 14 evidence would really swamp the case as to your client and confuse the jury. 15 16 Look. Your Honor -- just one second. MR. STILLMAN: 17 (Short pause while counsel confer.) 18 MR. STILLMAN: What my partner Jim Mitchell points 19 out to me, Your Honor, is that maybe I was too hasty. 20 THE COURT: I figured there would be some dissent 21 amongst those at this table. 22 MR. STILLMAN: That's why I bring my lawyer along, 23 you know, to make sure I get this right. 24 What Jim Mitchell points out to me, Your Honor, and 25 I should have pointed out to you, is that, yes, it is true

that, you know, that they have the commonalty of CONMEBOL.

But the evidence as to participation is not going to be the same. It is just not. And I think that that's where I really made my mistake in answering too guickly, Your Honor.

And so if you say what is the proof going to be, well, you know, it is going to be the proof that they have, or that they have and they are going to try to offer. But our --

THE COURT: Well, some of which you have obviously seen through discovery, no?

MR. STILLMAN: Your Honor, to say you have seen things in discovery in this case is to be a pretty hard thing -- there are mountains and mountains of material. And I would say, up to this point, that very little that I have seen would indicate to me that there's going to be that commonalty merely because they are in the CONMEBOL -- they are CONMEBOL related. So I don't think CONMEBOL is going to be the tie here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But you would agree, and, obviously, you have done so many cases you certainly have been in the situation where the evidence against one defendant may be much greater either in volume or quality than against another defendant, but that isn't necessarily enough to justify severance.

MR. STILLMAN: No, it isn't, all the time, and yet there are times, as I say, you know, as Judge Glasser found in

Upton, as he looked ahead to that case, he could see that the evidence with respect to these two defendants, I think they came from Atlanta, there was an Atlanta piece to that case, with respect to that, Judge Glasser said, "No, I don't think they belong here, and I am going to let them out." And he goes on to say maybe that there will be a plea some day by them.

But, nevertheless, so I think the fact that there is going to be more evidence with respect to one than the other is not really the point here. The point is, look. What are we struggling for? We are struggling for what -- a fair trial, right? And what we know to a certainty is you and Your Honor doing your job, you are going to do everything in your power to see to it that's a fair trial. And I totally get that and respect it.

But my concern is that having Marin, Jose Maria Marin, sitting in the courtroom where mountains of evidence are coming in that really have nothing to do with him, he really faces the specter of just, you know, just being convicted on something that he didn't do, in spite of your best efforts by instructions and all of the other things, and our efforts as lawyers to advocate on his behalf. And there is a way to avoid that. Now, it does put more burden on the system. I totally get that, but, you know, that's what we all get paid to do, you know.

THE COURT: Well, I will leave it to the government to respond to the evidentiary issue you raise because, obviously, you're making it to some extent, by your own admission, in the abstract. Because you don't know exactly what the quantum of evidence is going to be as to your client, versus Mr. Napout or Mr. Burga, who are similarly claiming that the mountain of evidence will be about some other defendants.

So, clearly, there is some truth that applies to these statements or not, and I think the government is in a better position to respond to that. But you have to acknowledge that your argument about the evidence really is based on a less than complete view of what that evidence will be.

MR. STILLMAN: Well, that's true, Your Honor, except that when I look at the indictment and I see, you know, hundreds of paragraphs and I am only in a half a dozen paragraphs, and I see scores and scores of criminal conspiracies charged, and I am only in a couple of the conspiracies charged, that is a fairly decent signal to me that the weight of the overall evidence is going to be far different with respect to the charge here. I mean, the weird thing, quite frankly, Your Honor, the strange thing about this situation right now is that you have the five of us here going to trial and an indictment that's got, you know, all this

stuff in there, and the people who are all -- they're either going to be witnesses, God knows what we'll find out about them, and so it is kind of a strange moment in this case where the government wants to put in the evidence of 236 paragraphs to these five gents over here. And what we're trying to do is figure out a way to see to it that we all, each of us, representing our respective clients, get a fair trial out of this, which is, obviously, I know your goal as much as it is ours.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, certainly I am going to ask the government about how much of the 236-paragraph indictment they intend to put on trial. I think that's a large part of the equation that we're all grappling with here.

So thank you very much, Mr. Stillman.

Let's go next to the attorneys for Mr. Burga.

MR. UDOLF: Good morning, Your Honor. Bruce Udolf on behalf of Mr. Burga.

I don't have much to add to what Mr. Stillman just said. I would point out to the Court that similarly to his client, my client is only mentioned in a few paragraphs of the RICO count as well. And there's an additional fact in my case because my client has not been extradited on the four other charges that are against him, which are two wire fraud charges and two money laundering charges.

THE COURT: But the obvious response, and the one

the government gives, is that even so, the evidence about the acts he committed has to be put in as part of the RICO charge against him to show how it is that he actually participated in the activities of the alleged RICO conspiracy.

So you don't really get any benefit, evidentiary-wise, from the fact that he was only extradited on the RICO conspiracy, which is obviously the much bigger charge.

MR. UDOLF: Well, Judge, my research isn't, in all honesty, is not complete on that issue so I am not willing to concede that point.

THE COURT: Well, quite frankly, even if you weren't in the case at all, the government might seek to put on that evidence just to show the pattern of racketeering engaged in by the conspiracy that's alleged, even if your client wasn't here and wasn't a defendant.

It is hard for me to imagine that now he is a defendant, how that would come out. That seems even quite the opposite of what should happen. But you can continue to do your research. Maybe you'll convince me otherwise. I just don't see much merit in that argument.

MR. UDOLF: The fact is, though, as Your Honor correctly observed, without undermining Mr. Stillman's argument on this point, I mean, there is a different situation in terms of the CONMEBOL defendants than there are against the

other defendants in this case.

And, you know, part of it is, has to do with the amount of prejudice against my client. It is clearly a different level of prejudice in admission of acts that were committed and committed by other defendants in connection with the CONMEBOL transactions, than in all the other transactions that are specified, that are set forth with a lot more specificity in the indictment than anything my client did. As a matter of fact, I can't imagine the allegations against my client being more vague, including some reference to him having agreed to receive in excess of seven figures. I've seen maybe a total of maybe no more than a dozen documents in this case that have anything to do with my client, out of 12 million so far. Now, admittedly, I have not gone through all the evidence in this case, and there may be others. But it is really a scant proportion of the evidence.

But, you know, the thing is, the government elected to bring this RICO charge, and now they are saying, "Well, we can put all this other junk into evidence because we -- the grand jury has returned an indictment on the RICO charge."

But they could just as well have kept it simple and charged Mr. Marin, Mr. Burga, for instance, with the CONMEBOL offenses or CONMEBOL offense. They elected to do this, and now they are sort of using that as an excuse to let in the kitchen sink and say "We can go into anything."

But at some particular point, that rises to a level of such prejudice. And I frankly don't presume to know what evidence there is out there about Mr. Webb, for instance, or all these other individuals, but I presume since he's the first name on the indictment, it is not going to be good, and there's going to be a lot of evidence out there that will not inure to my client's benefit. And so I'm concerned about that.

It may very well be that they may choose to limit the evidence that they make and present in their case in chief as to certain transactions. They are not required to go to trial on that. But if they do throw in the kitchen sink, that will severely prejudice my client.

When I was a prosecutor, I indicted dozens of RICO cases. I'm very familiar with the statute and the history of the statute. And as counsel previously noted, it was originally part of an anti-organized crime package. I think it was 1970 when it came into being, and it was largely the result of a protege of Robert Kennedy named Robert Blakey who came up with this scheme. And the whole purpose of it was to allow disparate acts and disparate actors to be taken down in one RICO umbrella.

But the reason for it was that even though there was extortion on the one hand, or union fraud on the other hand, they were all related to -- for instance, the Gambino family,

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just to throw out a familiar name, or the Genovese family, to throw out another name.

But those were associations-in-fact. But even if you didn't know all the actors, as you are not required to in most conspiracy cases, you still have a general idea that if you were associated with the family, there was a lot of bad stuff going on. And it was -- and you had a pretty good reason to believe that you were part of a larger whole, even though you didn't know all the actors.

In this particular case, the only commonalty we have, as counsel for the government has correctly noted, is that they all involve allegations of bribery. Well, you know, there could be all kinds of allegations that are the same. That doesn't mean that they should all be joined under a RICO umbrella. Just as what if these were involved in -- people involved in, say, the garment industry in South America, where I am given to understand, at least, that it is routine for buyers to accept gratuities, which is a form of commercial bribery. Commercial bribery is not a defense under most laws that I am aware of in South America, indeed, in the better Indeed, in the better part of the world, part of the world. it is part of -- an accepted part of doing business. subcontinent of Asia, they refer to it as "baksheesh," which roughly translated in our lingo would be "grease," you know, to make the wheels of commerce run smoothly.

And in this particular case, this was the way of life. And that's exactly why the Peruvian court refused to grant extradition as to the money laundering and the wire fraud counts, because all of those money laundering counts derivatively, but to the wire fraud count directly, was basically to a commercial bribery offense.

And the thing that's counterintuitive about it, and this will be the subject of another motion that we plan to file down the road, is that they sent over the most serious crime, which is based on this same theory, legal theory, basically, either derivatively through money laundering or directly through RICO predicates of mail fraud or wire fraud, of deprivation of honest services fraud, which is, in effect, commercial bribery.

The only logical explanation I have for that is they didn't want to get too much in the United States' face, since the United States is a substantial benefactor to Peru, so they basically asserted their sovereignty as to, you know, four throwaway conspiracies, but gave the government their other conspiracy. And that is one of the bases that I plan to file another motion or that we have agreed to recommend to the Court a briefing schedule on.

So it seems to me that the government has chosen its poison by using this RICO statute, which was intended to be an organized crime statute. Honestly, that's what it was

intended for. I know it has been extended far beyond the -THE COURT: Recognition, in your opinion.

MR. UDOLF: -- applications it was intended for. I, myself, as a prosecutor have used it for those. But I don't think I have ever seen a case quite as broad in scope as this. And to think that the RICO statute, the strained acronym, RICO, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, was actually a tribute or an homage to Edward G. Robinson's character in Little Caesar, whose name was Rico, the main -- in his breakout role as a gangster. So that's what it was about.

But this relatedness, this pattern, all things that the subsequent more recent case law have said that RICO must be -- there must be some showing of that in order to sustain the RICO charge, there is -- the only pattern is a similarity of crime. And, indeed, RICO was designed to bring about disparate types of crimes. And the fact that they are all similar, you know, you can have someone who's in the garment industry that basically pays bribes routinely, that does not mean that everyone in the garment industry, for instance, in Peru, would be part of a RICO conspiracy. There must be some relationship or some knowledge of that. And I don't think there is in this case, at least I haven't seen it thus far. And so that's -- I would address Your Honor's concern --

THE COURT: You do realize that you started this off

26 by saying, "I don't have much to add to this." But I am just 1 2 going to let you go on. No, I am not belittling --3 MR. UDOLF: It was a long flight up here. 4 (Laughter.) THE COURT: I know. You should make it worth your 5 6 I understand it. trip. 7 MR. UDOLF: All right. 8 I understand your argument. But a lot THE COURT: 9 of what you say, though, quite frankly, Mr. Udolf, is policy. 10 But the gist of what you're saying, and I think Mr. Paulson was alluding to the same, is that the government having used 11 12 the RICO statute in what some would say is an unprecedented 13 way, may have to pay the consequences for that in terms of 14 severance of defendants from each other at trial, or in 15 limiting the evidence that they put on to prove this 16 inordinately expansive application of the RICO statute. that pretty much the gist of what your --17 18 MR. UDOLF: Yes. And the fact is, Judge, if they 19 complain about the need for judicial economy, it would be much more economy, because if they would just try, just as a for 20 21 instance, the CONMEBOL defendants, I mean, we are talking 22 about, I would think, no more than a week long trial. What's 23 going to make this trial longer and more complicated is the 24 fact that they have chosen to at least potentially throw in 25 the kitchen sink.

THE COURT: Well, bear in mind that there are two issues here. One is the evidence that will be submitted as part of the RICO conspiracy proof, and how that affects all the defendants in ways that they say are disproportionate and violate 404, 403, and are unfair, and then there are the, if you will, inter-nesting fights between the defendants, three of whom are in a CONMEBOL related conspiracy specifically relating to two particular events, and then the two other defendants, Mr. Takkas and Mr. Trujillo, who are involved in separate conspiracies from everyone else.

So there's two categories of potential prejudice that's being claimed. I started off the conversation with the broader one, because it does in large part subsume much of what applies to most of the defendants, but certainly as to the CONMEBOL defendants, whom I have already asked the question of how can you separate yourselves from each other, really, and that's the second category.

But like I said, I see the issue, and we'll ask the government to respond to this, is having used RICO in this very expansive manner, and I think there's little debate that it is unprecedented and quite unusual the scope of this RICO conspiracy, should there be some consequence, sounds much more punitive than it is intended to be, but should there be some counteractive measure on the other side to ensure that there isn't an unfairness in terms of the quantity, the quality, the

volume, I guess quantity, or the disparateness of the evidence that's introduced as to these five defendants, given that we are having a trial of only five of the 27 or so indicted defendants. That's sort of the main question you are going to have to grapple with.

So, Mr. Udolf, did you want to say anything else?

MR. UDOLF: No, I've blabbed on enough.

THE COURT: No, no, it is okay. I am just making a little bit of fun.

All right. Next we have Mr. Takkas' attorney, Mr. Mehler. Go ahead.

MR. MEHLER: May I speak from here?

THE COURT: You're very old school. Yes, you may.

MR. MEHLER: Your Honor, just to focus and pick up on Mr. Udolf's point, the Court in teeing up the issue quoted from the *DiNome* case, which appears on page 14 of the government's brief. And after that, they cite six cases that sort of prove this point.

And when you look up those cases, they are almost identical, except for one difference. They all involve organized crime, they all involve murder, except for one. So all six organized crime, in the context that the others have defended it, and five of them relate to murder. And, again, it makes sense, if you're in a limited geographic sphere, it is not unreasonable to believe. They know each other, they

1 may know what the others are doing. Here, my client, 2 Mr. Takkas, is not only not a soccer official, been out of 3 soccer for two decades, he's not even from the same neighborhood, he's not even from the same country, he's not 4 even from the same continent. And they want to put him in 5 with the others. 6 7 It was so interesting, and I know -- I don't mean to do anything other than call it to the Court's attention, when 8 9 you were having the colloquy, you said, oh, there are these 10 three CONMEBOL defendants, so you are really just arguing 11 severance for Mr. Trujillo. Well, then there's a fifth guy, 12 Mr. Takkas. 13 THE COURT: Right. 14 MR. MEHLER: And what's important about Mr. Takkas is, he's not accused of taking any money here. Webb 15 16 supposedly took millions. There's no allegation here that he

THE COURT: But is there not an allegation that your client was the conduit for about a million dollars worth of bribes that went to Mr. Webb?

took anything.

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MR. MEHLER: That is, in fact, the allegation, and, you know, but, again, if --

THE COURT: There's a bank account identified even.

MR. MEHLER: Yes, Your Honor, but the question here is, should he be -- should he be tried with those bank records

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in a simple trial saying, you know, you -- these moneys came into this account, you know, these are the inferences. If the client wants to put on a defense, he will. And that's it. He's not tried based on 38 different schemes over 25 years. I think the Court wants me and wants all of us to focus on specifics, and they call -- because of these activities, they call my client an attaché, as if he was part of some important diplomatic service. I think "gopher" is really a better word. That's what he would be. But a high level gopher. A million THE COURT: dollars, you don't just entrust that to the man on the Love I mean, that's a little different thing. MR. MEHLER: Well, Your Honor, I would beg to differ. I would beg to differ. Mr. Webb, as we pointed out in our brief, is a --THE COURT: Sad accountant. MR. MEHLER: -- charming, not Mr. Webb, is not that --THE COURT: I'm sorry. MR. MEHLER: But he's a charming man who has really betrayed and fooled everybody, his country, his sport, his

family, his colleagues. And when he gets on the stand, I predict he will betray the government, too, with his lies.

I think that, again, my client is from the Cayman Islands, a tiny speck of a country that was ranked 201st out

of 209. There's a couple of soccer organizations that are doing worse, but it is not exactly Chelsea or Arsenal in the Premier League.

I think that, you know, Mr. Udolf said the government has elected to use the statute, and they are saying basically, "Tough luck. We have this statute, ha-ha, we can do what we want." And the court has said, you know, is it fair? And Rule 14 really assumes that joinder is proper as a technical legal matter. But then it is very broad in the way it -- you know, it says basically the court can do anything in order to ensure a fair trial.

And I think that it is a rule that allows a very broad remedy. And, yes, there should be a consequence here for the government, choosing to stretch the RICO statute beyond all -- what ought to be all recognizable limits. And I end with this, you know, which we cited in our brief, Judge Edward Weinfeld, who sat for so many years on the Southern District bench, said, "A single joint trial, however desirable, may not be had at the expense of a defendant's right to a fundamental trial." And even Zafiro, the latest Supreme Court case on severance, you know, requires merely that the defendant demonstrate that joinder will appear to prejudice him.

If my client is in with the others, the danger that he will be swept up in the weeks long, 25-year scope of these

38 separate schemes, is overwhelming. He basically stands no chance. And we are asking this Court to intervene and create a barrier to that, for the purpose of ensuring his fair trial.

Yes, Your Honor?

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THE COURT: Before you sit down, let me ask you two questions.

MR. MEHLER: Sure.

THE COURT: Isn't the argument that you make so emphatically about how severable Mr. Takkas' situation is, he's in a different continent, a different country, involved in a smaller conspiracy than everyone else, and everyone makes a variation of that argument, isn't that a double-edged sword? Because when you get to trial, isn't the argument that your client is on a different continent, he is involved in a different conspiracy, the evidence as to him is only this small sliver of evidence, relative to the mountains of evidence you have seen at this trial, can't that same argument be used, very effectively at trial, I think, by a good lawyer such as yourself and everybody else sitting around the table, to basically make clear to the jury that there's very little evidence as to everything else the government has as to everyone else, and to keep it straight for the jury?

Because this is different in a way from the RICO trials, the mob trials, where they are all in this very closely geographic and familial and friendship relationship,

where here, you have a very plausible potent argument that I think any juror would understand, is that Mr. Takkas is in an entirely different continent, he's at the Cayman Islands, he's nowhere near where these CONMEBOL defendants are, maybe he's never stepped foot in South America, isn't that an argument that actually says, we could keep this trial pretty focused as to each defendant, and, moreover, wouldn't the government have that as their main interest in order to have their convictions survive appeal? Should they convict people, they are not going to want to have a mosh pit of evidence and argue it broadly or sweepingly as to all the defendants in order to preserve any conviction that they obtain.

MR. MEHLER: Well, Your Honor, here I can really -- I understand the argument, it is a logical argument, and I guess my only response would be based on experience. Having had close to 35 years, almost equally in government and defense, you know, one likes to think that a jury getting a limiting instruction will listen to it perfectly. But, you know, maybe I've become a little too cynical in my dotage. I think that --

THE COURT: And not even a limiting instruction. I am not relying on them -- on my instructions, rather, I am relying on all of you to do your jobs as vigorously as you have and make it clear to the jury that there's only this little bit that applies to Mr. Takkas, this little bit that

applies to Mr. Trujillo, and so on. And the government, really, to do the same in order to have a viable conviction, assuming they get one.

MR. MEHLER: Well, again, reasonable minds can differ on that. My own very strong gut, based on, you know, more than a year in weeks in a courtroom, is that that is unlikely to happen. That if you have jurors going back there, they will say, "That guy, yeah, what was he doing here? Well, did you hear? He did this. It is, you know, and he was associated with the guy Webb who was horrible. You know, he, obviously -- there must be something. Why would he" -- and you say, "No, no, that will never happen, they'll make" -- THE COURT: That has to happen as to Mr. Takkas.

THE COURT: That has to happen as to Mr. Takkas.

That I get. That's the case against him.

MR. MEHLER: Sure, sure. But he's going to be testifying, you know, more broadly.

So, again, reasonable minds can differ. As a practical matter, I don't see it. I think the government uses the RICO statute. Not accusing them of bad faith, I just think it is there, you know, they do it because they can. You know, it is like climbing Mt. Everest. It is there, they use it. It's the nuclear bomb. It has nothing to do with organized crime, but it really helps you to get a conviction. And that's what we worry about here.

THE COURT: The kitchen sink approach.

MR. MEHLER: The kitchen sink.

THE COURT: One last question. You cited to me

Judge Ross' decision in Asaro, A-s-a-r-o. Doesn't that case,
though, really dictate an opposite result? Because I think it
represents a line of cases, which many of you've relied upon,
especially in the mob context, for where severance is
appropriate, where you have such a great disparity in the
seriousness in the type of crimes that each of the defendants
are accused of committing, even though they are part of the
same RICO organization or conspiracy.

And the government has addressed this point, and I am struck by Asaro because Judge Ross, and you rely heavily on her decision, makes clear that the main focus of her severance decision is because the two leaders who were to be tried with the two lessers, if you will, of this organization, had committed or were being charged with murders and attempted murders, whereas the two defendants to whom she did grant a severance had been involved in nonviolent offenses. Isn't that really the more appropriate situation where severance, based on inflammatory or prejudicial in terms of type of crime, the type of crime that jurors can't see beyond, and would tend to sweep everyone into the same bucket, isn't that the more appropriate place for a severance than this one where everyone's accused of bribery, money laundering, wire fraud?

MR. MEHLER: Well, I mean, I think that there was a

symmetry in the *Asaro* case because in those cases there were charges of violent crime against the one defendant, and then there was an extortion charge against another, which is considered a violent crime as well. Here you have so-called white collar crimes --

THE COURT: Across the board.

MR. MEHLER: Across the board, and I think that there is also symmetry because the *Asaro* case also involved a situation of a lot of different things going back decades.

And I think that Judge Ross felt this was a very -- the guy who was severed, this was a very isolated incident involving a period of time.

And the Court said to me, "Well, Mr. Takkas is associated with Mr. Webb, he got the money in." What if the Court saw -- hears evidence, as I believe it will, that the guy got no money for it? That's just dumb. Why are you, if you are participating in a conspiracy to launder money -- there were people here, I know there was a guy named Margulies, I believe, was a money launderer. He charged a percentage, right?

There was a relationship, the evidence will show, between Mr. Webb and Mr. Takkas, that was a relationship that went back a long time. They were proud Caribbeans.

Mr. Takkas is originally from England, but, you know, Mr. Webb was sort of an up-and-comer. There was a lot of pride in that

community that he might rise to the president of FIFA. And I think this Court can see that, and I think the evidence would show, that that's what motivated him, this desire to help him.

Now, you'll say, "Well, what did he get the money for?" Well, there's going to be a trial, and there is an explanation for that. I promise the Court.

But, again, I ask the Court --

THE COURT: I can't wait.

MR. MEHLER: -- something's wrong here that everybody who's charged with getting lots of bribes, and this guy got nothing. That's going to be an interesting trial.

THE COURT: Right. But that's what trials are for. I mean, I think we are skipping over the main issue, which is I was just trying to say that isn't it true that in most of the cases that have been cited where severance has been granted, it is more on the basis that the prejudice that's alleged or that prompts the severance is really one of the kinds of crime, as opposed to even the evidence, and I know there's been one Judge Glasser case cited to me, but the volume of evidence or the disparate activities involved.

In other words, in most of the RICO cases involving the mob, you have different members of the mob or factions of the mob doing all sorts of very separate criminal activities. That's the nature of mob activity, that is part of the reason that the RICO statute was passed, was to try to bring them all

together in some semblance of an association-in-fact. I am not necessarily going to enter into this policy debate with Mr. Udolf on that issue, and you'll have your Rule 29, I understand that, as Mr. Paulson said, to make.

But I am just trying to get to the point that most of the cases that have been cited to me have to do with the prejudice that emanates from the differences in severity of the crime itself, as opposed to the volume of the crime or the separateness of the activity.

MR. MEHLER: Sure. And I would say, in response -THE COURT: Volume of evidence. Not volume of
crime.

MR. MEHLER: I would say that there's a small volume of evidence, and the fact that, you know, there are charges of bribe receiving by others, and, you know, I think the evidence will show that my client got nothing. The fact that the others are all members of national heads of soccer organizations or the head of CONMEBOL, my client was the general secretary of Cayman Islands soccer two decades ago and has been out of soccer so that they have to use the self-deprecating, self-created word "attaché" to get him in, I suggest that that is a difference of substance and, indeed, severity, that will have real consequences if the Court doesn't step in to help ensure fairness. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mehler.

All right. Next we have the attorney for Mr. Napout, Mr. Pappalardo.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Thank you, Your Honor.

If I may, Your Honor, I am not going to go over any of these arguments, but I need to apply the facts as we know them today. And the other dimension that we have is we are asking for speedy trial --

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PAPPALARDO: -- so that I am not trying to be repetitious here.

As the Court knows, we filed our motion for speedy trial on October 31 of last year, and we are hearing it today. So some of the information contained therein with respect to dates and things like that may be a little off.

Your Honor, we have a superseding indictment here with 27 defendants, 92 counts, 15 separate schemes, over a 24-year period. Mr. Napout is in five counts and is alleged to be involved in two schemes. The important point is that there were no specific factual allegations that we have seen, either in the indictment or based upon any of the discovery we've seen so far, that Mr. Napout agreed to enter into any conspiracy.

From the beginning in this case, Your Honor,

Mr. Napout has asserted his right to a speedy trial. From the
time of the initial appearance, in fact, before that, he was

the only one who immediately waived extradition from Switzerland. He did it as quickly as he possibly could. At the time of his initial appearance, we even objected to any excludable time because of our insistence upon getting a speedy trial.

On every hearing since then, particularly before

Judge Dearie -- by the way, this is the second motion for a

speedy trial we filed. We filed one in March of 2016, also.

At every hearing we've been on the record opposing any kind of delay trying to accelerate the case as to Mr. Napout. We contend, Your Honor, that severance in this case for Mr. Napout is necessary to protect his right to a speedy trial. Absent being joined with codefendants, Napout's speedy trial clock expired on May 4, 2016.

THE COURT: I have to stop you. I've read your papers, and I've, of course, heard your speedy trial argument once before.

There are so many different tolling or exclusionary provisions that seem to apply to Mr. Napout's case, but let me just focus on one, and this is the one I am sort of particularly curious on what your response is. You have filed on behalf of your client four motions, at least, and I am not even including any of the bail modification motions. I don't consider those as impeding or delaying in any way the trial in this case. But you filed a motion to dismiss the indictment,

you filed a motion for a bill of particulars, you filed a motion disputing discovery issues, namely a claim of common interest and attorney-client privilege, that was only decided on March 10, 2017, by written order, but that warranted and required an evidentiary hearing and testimony and substantial briefing, and now you are filing a severance motion. I assume you will also have motions to file in limine, perhaps suppression.

with all of that process that you have sought to employ on your client's behalf, which is absolutely your right, if not your duty to do, how can you now turn around and say your speedy trial date would have run back in May of 2016? Every single one of those motions allows me to exclude the time while they are being resolved, or else you wouldn't get to file them if I didn't stop that speedy trial clock. You have to brief them, the government has to respond, and I have to decide them, after giving you oral argument, which has happened with every motion. So I just don't understand how you can even make this claim.

MR. PAPPALARDO: It hasn't happened with every motion, Your Honor. First of all, we filed a motion for a bill of particulars, we didn't argue that case, and you allowed that motion in part without argument.

THE COURT: But we had an argument on the motion to dismiss, which included the bill of particulars. So I don't

think I prevented you from arguing that, but be that as it may, you had an argument on the motion to dismiss, which was conjoined with your bill of particulars request. And I granted your bill of particulars request in part.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Exactly.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PAPPALARDO: But, Your Honor, what I would suggest to the Court are two things. One is, that a motion to dismiss did not delay anything. There were other motions to dismiss here. It was a clear motion, yes, you took argument and you denied the motion.

THE COURT: But I think you're missing my point. Every single one of these motions you file under 3161(h) allows me to, as I think is appropriate or else I can't resolve them and you can't brief them adequately, to stop the speedy trial clock. So I am just quibbling with you about your calculation of the speedy trial time. If you didn't want to file any motions whatsoever, I guess in theory your time could have stopped. And then your argument to me is why I made you brief them lockstep with everyone else. That's a different argument.

But you can't actually argue to me as a matter of law that after filing all these motions, your speedy trial time ran back in May of 2016. That, I think, is simply inaccurate. If you want to argue that it was incorrect of me,

or somehow violated Mr. Napout's speedy trial right to make you brief it on a schedule with everyone else, fine, that's an argument.

But I think to ignore the fact that the time must stop, I think, in order to give you a fair opportunity to brief the issues that you chose to raise for your client, as you should, I don't think you then get to argue that somehow speedy trial ran back in May 2016. That just doesn't compute, quite literally, under 3161(h).

MR. PAPPALARDO: Well, Your Honor, I would respond -- I understand the Court's point. I would respectfully disagree for a couple of reasons.

The first is, we did file the motion. The motion wasn't heard. We filed it on October 31. You indicated --

THE COURT: The speedy trial motion?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Yes. The speedy trial motion. And you said the government doesn't have to respond until they respond with everybody else.

Your Honor, with regard to the motion relating to the attorneys in the common interest privilege, let me point out to the Court one simple thing. We were asked by the government to provide them with a list of attorneys who represented Mr. Napout. And we did.

We were concerned, because CONMEBOL had indicated, and we received this in writing, that they were going to waive

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44 the attorney-client privilege. So when we -- across the No limitations. Based upon that, and based upon what we asserted was a common interest privilege --THE COURT: Which Judge Levy denied. MR. PAPPALARDO: But, Your Honor, based upon that, we had a hearing. At the beginning of that hearing, Your Honor, I asked the Court to determine what it is we were there to argue. Because subsequent to CONMEBOL's blank waiver of the attorney-client privilege, they modified the waiver and --THE COURT: I am not disagreeing with you about any of that. MR. PAPPALARDO: But that's not on us. That's what I am trying to say to you. THE COURT: No, but it doesn't matter if it is on you or not. You could have obviously waived and said, "Okay, fine, if you are not going to honor a privilege, we are not going to fight it." But you chose, and I am not saying inappropriately, you have to make whatever strategic decisions you think are correct for your client, you chose to argue that Mr. Napout was entitled to a common interest privilege over the position of CONMEBOL. Once you did that and you filed a motion, the clock stops, to allow that motion to be heard, under 3161(h). Why is that not appropriate?

MR. PAPPALARDO: If I may, Your Honor, because in

that case, again, Your Honor, the blanket waiver of privilege was then superseded so that it didn't include the only thing covered by the common interest privilege we were asserting, which were commercial transactions. So, quite frankly, there was no need for a hearing because they didn't waive the privilege with regard to commercial transactions.

That wasn't our -- the only thing that the common interest privilege touched upon, if it existed at all, was commercial transactions. Subsequent to their blanket waiver, they said, "Oh, no, no, it doesn't include commercial transactions." As far as I was concerned, then it's over.

THE COURT: Well, you may disagree with Judge Levy to having a hearing to fully flesh out the issues. But, again, the principle is nonetheless the same. The statute provides that time will stop while motions are being briefed and resolved.

So, again, your speedy trial argument, your technical argument about violating speedy trial just doesn't hold because there have been periods stopped throughout this case, from the beginning of at least my first encounter with everybody, until now, while all of these motions, the motion to dismiss that you wanted to file, the bill of particulars motion that you did file, the severance motion that you have filed, the time has stopped. You cannot include that as any kind of violation of speedy trial.

The minute you say, "I want to file a motion," and the Court, as it should, allows you to do that, we are allowed to stop that clock. I don't understand how you can say, "I want all this process, and yet I still want my speedy trial to have run over a year ago or almost a year ago." That's just not accurate under the statute or in terms of the process or the procedure that's been followed in this case, initiated by you, in large part, and some of the other defendants who want to file other motions.

And, moreover, I think the case was declared complex from the beginning. Do you really take issue with that, when you are coming in here and saying it is a 236-paragraph indictment, it involves millions of pages of discovery? You would concede it is complex, no?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, the case was declared complex by Judge Dearie simply based upon the discovery.

That's what he said.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, okay, we can revisit it, but has it gotten any less complex, in your mind?

MR. PAPPALARDO: I believe it has, Your Honor. Most of the defendants have pled guilty. There are five defendants left.

THE COURT: Who are all arguing it is extraordinarily complex with millions of pages of evidence that can't come in against them. In order to make that

1 assessment and that argument, you have to go through those 2 millions of pages of documents and read everything the 3 government's giving you. This case is unavoidably complex. 4 It involves evidence coming in from all over the world. I understand that some of the provisions to exclude time, toll 5 the speedy trial clock are cabined in by reasonableness in a 6 7 year time limit. Understood. But you have four different 8 ways in which this case has to slow down. Most of which, if 9 not all of which, inures to the benefit of the defendants. 10 And beyond that, explain to me how your client has 11 been prejudiced by this? 12 MR. PAPPALARDO: Well, that's a different story. 13 I'll get to that, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. MR. PAPPALARDO: But the foreign evidence is only 15 16 for a year. THE COURT: 17 Understood. That's what I just said. 18 vear. Yes. I understand. 19 MR. PAPPALARDO: And we're well beyond that now. 20 THE COURT: For sure. I agree with that, and I 21 think the evidence that's come in, that's what you have in 22 front of you, but beyond that we have the overall complexity 23 of this case of you all getting through that evidence. 24 don't think anyone would have been happy if after that year I 25 said, "Okay, we are going to trial tomorrow. You have the

evidence, the government's time has run out." Nobody wanted to have a trial in this case within that short amount of time, and then the question becomes, must you go to trial with the rest of the defendants. And that's your argument. Being joined with them has somehow prejudiced your client.

MR. PAPPALARDO: It is my argument, Your Honor, that it does prejudice my client based upon two things. One of them is the facial aspects of the indictment, what the indictment specifically alleges, and the other is the review of the discovery that we've received to date as it relates to Mr. Napout.

 $\label{eq:constraints} \mbox{And what I can say to you, Your Honor, is that} \\ \mbox{the --}$ 

THE COURT: By the way, I should correct myself. It is not 230 paragraphs, it is 500-something paragraphs in 236 pages or something like that.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, we have had -- there's nothing in this indictment, as it relates to Mr. Napout, that suggests that he joined the conspiracy. There's absolutely nothing. In this case, Your Honor, we have seen --

THE COURT: Are you switching arguments now to the severance issue, or are you staying on the speedy trial issue?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Well, they really go together,
Your Honor, because antagonistic defenses, which I will get
to, goes to the issue of speedy trial.

But the quantum of the evidence, Your Honor -- the evidence is massive. We've conceded that. Everybody understands that. The evidence against Mr. Napout is not. And with respect to that, there are no allegations in the indictment that Mr. Napout was part of the -- part of the conspiracy. He is -- there are no documents that are referred to in the indictment, there are no overt acts in the indictment, there are no financial documents in the indictment, there's no forfeiture count in the indictment as to Mr. Napout. There are no comments that explains what it is that he supposedly did to either be part of the conspiracy or how he interacted with his coconspirators.

And what it says, Your Honor, what it says is that Mr. Napout agreed with others on one conspiracy to take money

And what it says, Your Honor, what it says is that Mr. Napout agreed with others on one conspiracy to take money and another conspiracy to get money, basically. And that's what it says.

THE COURT: Are "take" and "get" different?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PAPPALARDO: In one they are alleging that there was an agreement to get money, which presumably wasn't paid.

And in another one, that there was money paid.

But there is no wire transfers of money into his bank accounts. All of the other defendants or many of the other defendants, Your Honor, have an incredible laundry list

of evidence that supports what's contained in the indictment.

That's not the same for Mr. Napout. And we've looked at the

discovery. The discovery doesn't help us on that, Your Honor,

even with the Court's allowing of the bill of particulars.

And for those reasons alone, we would tell you that it is unfairly prejudicial for him to be tried with others. Because it is not a question of whether you can argue and cross-examine witnesses, it is really a question of a jury's perception, and being lumped together in a prejudicial way, in an unfairly prejudicial way, with others, where there's a large quantum of evidence. That's what we are arguing, Your Honor.

The other thing is, you have to look at the antagonistic defense piece of this.

THE COURT: Yeah, I'm interested in this. Go ahead.

Tell me how it's antagonistic.

MR. PAPPALARDO: If you look, Your Honor, at page 13 of our brief, where we have detailed for the Court the tapes in this case --

THE COURT: Yeah, I am aware of the one you say is exculpatory.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Well, there are two that are exculpatory, Your Honor. Those are the only two. There are 147 tapes, containing a total of 113 hours and change of recordings. Napout spoke six times, for a total, in the

aggregate, of seven minutes.

On those -- on the only two tapes of substance, the first one on May 1, 2014, he basically says, it is there in the brief, Your Honor, he says that "Anybody comes to you saying that I am in on anything, I'm not. And you know that."

And the person agrees: "Yes, I know that."

"And they are liars." And there's an agreement on that.

That's an antagonistic defense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Vis-à-vis who?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Vis-à-vis codefendants, Your Honor.

THE COURT: But this is not a universe where there was a singular crime that had to be committed by the only two people in the room. He could have not taken a bribe, and the other people took a bribe. He may disagree that a testifying coconspirator said, "Yes, he took a bribe with me," but that's what you cross-examine on. That's not an antagonistic defense. An antagonistic defense is one where the jury has to choose one of the defendants as having done the crime. They could find based on the evidence that you've just cited, or other evidence, that your client didn't commit the crime, and that anyone who says he did is a liar. Flat out. Simple, right? That's not antagonistic. That's challenging the evidence that the government's putting forward.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, the issue isn't whether

he -- somebody's saying he took money. What they're saying is, that they understand that he was going to take money, which he's -- which he is --

THE COURT: So same thing. It is not mutually exclusive. The point is the jury could decide, "You are right. Somebody may say he agreed to take money, but they are just lying." It doesn't mean that they have to then choose the person who said he agreed to take money is the only other person. In other words -- and I don't even know if you are talking about any of the defendants sitting here, which I -- actually, it would only have to be the other two gentlemen who are involved in the CONMEBOL conspiracy. And you haven't said to me that you expect either of them, you know, or the evidence to come out that one of the three of you, or even two of the three of you, had to have done this in order for it to have happened.

It seems to me that the theory is some group, either the entire or some subpart of the group, took bribes. That's not -- that's not antagonistic. That's just challenging the government's evidence as to whoever says your guy agreed to take money or took money.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, I don't know who those other people are, and, certainly, the discovery doesn't provide it.

THE COURT: It doesn't matter. It is the nature of

the claim. This isn't a zero sum total situation. Like I said, two people in the room, drugs disappear, one of them has to be the person. So, therefore, if the two defendants who are in the room go to trial, they have to accuse each other in a way that the jury cannot avoid convicting one of them, right?

This is not that situation. It is more like you guys all sitting around the table and, you know, my deputy says three of you decided to take a bribe. Well, she could just be wrong. And it doesn't mean that by virtue of that the other people have to get convicted. So it is not antagonistic, you know what I am saying, under the law.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, with respect to *DiNome*, we argue that in our reply brief, and explain why it shouldn't apply in this case. But, basically, in that case, what the Court did was, in that case, of course, nobody was asking for a motion to sever. The Hellmans decided that -- in fact, the court implored them to sever the case, and they wouldn't do it. And once the RICO conspiracy was dismissed, basically, the case was a mistrial. And that is what we are looking at here in the context of Napout.

You know, Your Honor, in the indictment, there's no evidence that Mr. Napout arranged to receive or got any tainted funds. He's not alleged to have attended any meetings on or about August 2013, either in Buenos Aires or London,

like others, that -- or Datisa.

There's -- he's not named in allegations detailing the use of any kind of financial institutions in the United States to make payments. That's not in the indictment. But it is with others.

He's not alleged to have deposited any illicit funds into any account of his or any account, period. Napout's bank accounts or properties are not listed in the forfeiture portion of the indictment.

He's not named as having committed any specific acts of bribes or kickbacks.

He was not recorded or intercepted participating in any conspiracy. In fact, it is exactly the opposite.

He's denying involvement more than a year before the original arrest took place in May of 2015.

THE COURT: You're aware, of course, that the government is going to make the contrary argument that that was a false exculpatory statement that is indicative of guilty conscience versus something else.

But, I mean, here's my -- I understand your fundamental point, which is that there's a disparity in the volume of evidence that's going to be brought to bear on your client, and, therefore, it is unfair to try him even with his other CONMEBOL defendants, because the jury won't be able to sort out what evidence applies to him as opposed to what

evidence applies to not only the CONMEBOL defendants, but all of the other participants in the RICO conspiracy. I understand your argument.

I don't agree with it because I think this happens in cases all the time, that there's going to be disparities in evidence, and that's what your job as the defense attorney is to do at trial, which is to point that absence of evidence, just as you've done quite effectively here, to try to argue that there's no evidence to convict your client on.

So that's -- I understand your fundamental point.

MR. PAPPALARDO: I appreciate that, Your Honor.

Just let me make one more comment, please.

In March of last year, I pointed out, based upon the discovery, that there was only one tape that dealt with Mr. Napout, where he was saying "hello" in front of a crowded elevator.

At that point in time the government confirmed that. That's all there was with respect to Mr. Napout. When we listened to all of the tapes, they failed to identify the exculpatory portion. So they argued with, you know, with certainty that he was only on one tape. So if they argue today that it must be false exculpatory because a year before the indictments he must have known about this, I mean, I am sure that they, you know, that's an argument they might make. But we see no evidence of that. If they had evidence of that,

Your Honor, don't you think that would be in the indictment?

THE COURT: Not necessarily. I mean, you all know,

3 the government doesn't lay all their cards on the table in an

4 | indictment, to be sure.

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  PAPPALARDO: I would like to see some cards, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, understood. But bear in mind that I am just taking a wild guess, not based on anything I know. But, obviously, this case is probably going to involve some cooperators who were in the room, and you won't get some of

that evidence until later.

I understand, this is seemingly -- we can have a whole policy debate led by Mr. Udolf about whether that's fair or not, but I think that might be the reason that some of this evidence -- or you are not seeing all the evidence, put it that way.

MR. PAPPALARDO: Well, as of March, they didn't know about it. But what I am saying to you, Your Honor, is that the entire case against Mr. Napout is dependent upon cooperating witnesses.

THE COURT: That may well be so. But that doesn't make it any less potent evidence, right? It is evidence, to be sure.

MR. PAPPALARDO: No, but, Your Honor, it goes exactly to the heart of severance and unfair prejudice.

THE COURT: No, quite the opposite, actually. If you have a cooperator who's testifying about two, the same events, or tournaments, the ones that your client and two of the other defendants at the table are charged with, then the efficiency argument really runs in favor of the government. Why have a cooperator testify more than once as to the same three defendants? That would be inefficient, at least.

So cooperator testimony, if you are talking about a person who was familiar with the negotiation for these two tournaments that your client and two other defendants are charged with accepting bribes in connection with, it seems to me they have the better of the argument about why they should, at least those three defendants, should be tried together.

But I want to hear from the government. This is sort of the mysterious question of what evidence does the government intend to prove, at least in categorical terms. Because -- and thank you, Mr. Pappalardo. I didn't mean to stop you. I assume you're done?

MR. PAPPALARDO: Thank you.

THE COURT: Let's turn to the government. Because the big looming question is, how much evidence does the government really intend to put in to prove the RICO conspiracy? I have given you some idea of my own doubt about the potential overbreadth, given how the government has chosen to apply the RICO doctrine, which is fairly singular and

unusual. It goes well beyond the typical RICO case that we see in this district. I am not saying it's never been done before. But the scope of it, geographically and otherwise, is certainly great.

So let me just tee this up for you, Ms. Mace.

I may well agree with you on the legal principle that because you've alleged a RICO conspiracy, you are allowed to put in all the evidence that would prove the existence of the enterprise, as well as the pattern of racketeering. That, in theory, is a correct proposition. But it has prudential limits, right? You can't do this to the point that it really does deluge the defense with irrelevant evidence about the culpability of the bad acts of other members of this conspiracy. Would you agree with that?

MS. MACE: Yes, Your Honor.

And I think that I want to go right to the heart of the issue, as Your Honor has identified it. What's the consequence to having charged a broad RICO conspiracy in this way? And there certainly are consequences.

I think the main consequence is that the government faces an enormous burden of proof here. We have to prove the racketeering conspiracy that was returned in the indictment by the grand jury. And so counsel for Mr. Takkas says the government just does it because it can. It charges these broad RICOs because it can. But, actually, that's not the

situation here. The problem is the nature of the crime. And that's what the grand jury identified, and the indictment that was returned is based on the type of crime that's at issue here. And so we don't have a situation where you have little discrete incidents of bribery or corruption, you have something that is a bigger, broader problem. And that's what the RICO statute was designed to combat. And so it is charged in that way.

THE COURT: Let me ask you a specific question. I am only interrupting you because this could easily get very macro as opposed to I want to get a little more micro with you. There are 15 schemes that have letter names in the indictment. Is it your intention, and I know that you don't know exactly what case you will put on, to prove the existence of every one of those schemes as part of the RICO conspiracy?

MS. MACE: No, not necessarily. And so I think what's important is to place us in context or procedurally where we make those determinations.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MACE: So right now, where it's a question of just whether there's severance. And I want to talk a little bit in a moment about the types of cases in which courts grant severance in the RICO context. But then there's the separate issue, Rule 403, and that's a very real issue, and the government acknowledges that, and that's something that we

will address to the Court, and I think that's basis of a separate motion to say, "Okay, here we have, these are the defendants going to trial. We have five defendants." And how are we going to prove what we have to prove based on the indictment and a pattern that is charged.

And so what we anticipate doing, as we do in other RICO cases, is that we say the conduct of the specific defendants is this, and we also intend to prove other conduct -- other crimes.

THE COURT: As part of the pattern of racketeering.

MS. MACE: As part of the pattern.

And so we always detail that in a motion for the Court to say, these are the other things that we need to prove in order to prove the pattern, to show relatedness, to show the threat of continuing activity. And so we will detail that, and the defense can argue that something's too prejudicial, or it's cumulative. And we are just not at that point yet. But I can tell you, Your Honor, we are not going to prove up every single scheme because we won't need to. And it may be if there's fewer defendants by the time we get there, it would be even less. We won't do more than what is necessary for lots of reasons, one, efficiency, one, as Your Honor pointed out, we don't want to have the evidence sort of dwarf who is there, we will focus on who's there. But we have to prove the pattern and we'll do that. And it's been

charged this way, and we are entitled to prove the pattern.

So I would propose the specific 403 issues should be decided by the Court, but that would be the basis of a separate motion. The question here is whether the way it is charged requires severance, and I think that's a separate issue.

THE COURT: Let me ask you one question. Is it conceivable that you would proceed to trial and you would set this forth in the documents you are mentioning, that you would only prove the four schemes that are alleged against these particular defendants; is that conceivable?

MS. MACE: I don't think so, Your Honor, because one of the things that we need to prove is the relationship and the relatedness over the pattern, which also goes to proving the enterprise -- corruption of the enterprise itself. And there are certain types of schemes that will be the basis of -- individual witnesses will describe multiple schemes that show that this is a pattern of continued activity across the region, both North America and South America. So it is not that you have a one-off instance of bribery in World Cup qualifying matches, but something that happens over and over again. And that's why this is such a big problem. It's not that there's one guy who took a bribe here and it's totally unrelated to that. We have to prove that they're related and show we are going to do that through the evidence and the

pattern.

THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead.

MS. MACE: So I think as I noted, there's a separate issue of when severance is required, which is a little different than the evidentiary issue. And there are some cases in the RICO context in which severance is granted. Those are generally two contexts. One, sometimes the court will grant it when a case is a mega trial. It is so huge that it just can't be managed. And so you have a couple cases cited by the defendants, *Gallo* and *Andrews*, and *Casamento*, where you have 20, 30 more defendants and trials that lasted more than a year. That's not the situation that we have here.

Everyone cites the statistics, they say how many paragraphs, how many pages, how many defendants. What we have is a five-defendant trial. That's not that much.

THE COURT: But that's what they're saying. So, therefore, how many schemes will you introduce against them? That's their concern.

MS. MACE: Which is the evidentiary question.

THE COURT: Correct. Okay.

MS. MACE: So if we had all 40-plus defendants, people and entities that have been charged in this case, all here, I think we would agree with you, we can't have a trial where you have 40 cross-examinations on every witness. It is just too unwieldy. And so there's some cases like that. And,

interestingly, when they have granted severance, they break it into trials that look a lot like this one. You have -- which one was it.

I think it was *Andrews*, the El Rukns case in Chicago, you had 20-plus defendants, and it is broken into trials of five or four defendants. Exactly the sort of size we have here. And we're not talking about a year or two-year long trial. Much shorter than that. Something that's manageable. So I think this case does not fit in those sets of cases that the defendants have cited.

The other type of case where you sometimes have severance is, as Your Honor pointed out, where there's certain types of crimes that are so heinous that they then reflect on the defendants who are involved in a different type of context. So the *Asaro* case is one of those. You had a 40-year racketeering conspiracy, really awful murders. And as evidenced in a recent trial in this courthouse, you had evidence of moving a body, you have all sorts of very troubling crimes, and then you had a couple defendants with extortions in a discrete period of time. Severance was warranted, Judge Ross found there.

In other cases cited by the defendants, the same sort of divisions have been made. You have sometimes the defendants alleged to have participated in murders or tried separately from extortions, or gambling, separated off. You

have those sorts of situations.

Here, we pointed out, that all the defendants are alleged to have participated in the same type of conduct. We have a lot of reaction in the reply brief to that, saying it is the same type of conduct, but it is all different. Yes, but that's what RICO is. You have different instances of crime, and the point that we are making is just that this is not a situation where one type of crime overshadows another. And on the point that some defendants seem to think that there will be more evidence against one or the other, there's no cases that say that. There's no cases that say just because one defendant, there's more evidence against him, he should be severed from the others.

And I think the reality is that's not going to be the case, in any event. We'll have multiple witnesses who speak to many of the different defendants, many different schemes, there will be lots of overlap in the documents and in the witness testimony.

So I think to just go back to Your Honor's question about the consequence of how we've charged this, as I said, the consequence is that we have a heavy burden. We have to prove that relatedness and the threat of continuity into the future. And that's something that is very real here. This is why this case was charged in this way, because as one of defense counsel said, this was a way of life. This was a

problem that was so pervasive that it was a pattern that was across continents, across different soccer federations. It requires a different type of charge than having one-off little charges as to individual crimes. And that's why it is charged that way.

THE COURT: Well, the other consequence, I assume, is that I might be more restrictive when we get to the point of analyzing what evidence you are going to put in about the RICO conspiracy. That could be the other, quote-unquote, consequence, as I have labeled it.

MS. MACE: Potentially. But, Your Honor, I think the important thing at that time will be to apply Rule 403. And so, here, I don't think any evidence will be of that sort of heinous types that makes it so difficult for a jury to hear as to one defendant and not think of as to another, if the issue is cumulative, I think we will probably be --

THE COURT: Or irrelevant, rather. It doesn't relate to these defendants. That's going be the argument you are going to hear.

MS. MACE: Yes. And some defendants will argue that it is irrelevant. And if we believe it is relevant because it is necessary to prove a pattern, then we will lay out why that is and how it ends up -- how it helps to demonstrate that pattern. That's our burden of proof, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is one pattern. And so we will seek

to introduce that evidence. But we are not going to try to introduce cumulative evidence, because that hurts us as well. We don't want to have the important stuff buried by other stuff that has nothing to do with the trial defendants. We're only going to do that when we need to to prove that element and burden that we have.

So I think that is the gist of our argument on severance. I have just a few things to say on speedy trial unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: No. Go right ahead.

MS. MACE: I think we'll rest on the law that we set forth in our brief, but there's just a couple factual points that I wanted to correct for the record, having listened to Mr. Pappalardo on this.

One, Your Honor noted that Defendant Napout has filed four motions, and Mr. Pappalardo pointed out that it was on October 31 that he filed his motion for severance. I think one -- it's a little point, but something that has some significance is that a couple days later, on November 2, he asked for a request for an extension to file his motions to dismiss. So he got in his severance motion early, able to make the rhetorical point, I would argue, that he has moved for severance then. And the schedule set by the Court was then adjourned two weeks so that he could file his motions to dismiss. A small point, but just demonstrates that he wanted

to be able to file the motion to dismiss. We didn't oppose the extension. We are all just participating in the same schedule.

With regard to privilege, I would just note, I disagree with a lot of what Mr. Pappalardo said about the record, but it can speak for itself. I'll just note, though, that this was not only an issue about the common interest privilege, that going back to -- I have a letter from July of 2016, where defense counsel sends the government a list of lawyers representing Mr. Napout, and several of the lawyers on there never represented Mr. Napout. And it took us a long time to unpack that and figure out what was going on, who these lawyers were. Many of them -- one was the general counsel for CONMEBOL. So it took the government some time to figure out how to do the privilege review. And that contributed to the delay.

THE COURT: One question I have. When were the documents that were the subject of the discovery dispute seized by the government? At the time of Mr. Napout's arrest, or later?

MS. MACE: With regard to the privilege dispute, it began, I guess, with the seizure from CONMEBOL, which was early January, I believe, January 7.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: 2016.

MS. MACE: Yes. 2016. And so promptly after that, we began speaking with counsel for CONMEBOL, as well as counsel for Napout, to try to figure out what lawyers represented whom so that we could do this privilege review. That process has taken a long time. There were several things that were not accurately presented to us, and that's why we had to ask Judge Levy to resolve the issue. And he found that there was a difference in the representation of who represented whom, that would have been told to the government as well as the issue of the common interest privilege.

THE COURT: Right. As I guess as importantly, the time that the government seized those CONMEBOL documents, the defendant had already been charged and then was aware of the seizure, hence prompting this procedure where he was allowed to indicate who -- which lawyers may have represented him for purposes of asserting a privilege as to some of these CONMEBOL documents.

MS. MACE: Yes. And we reached out to him. We have a long series of letters that are now all in the record from the hearing before Judge Levy, where we asked everyone who might have in interest, including the law firms, everyone, to tell us who represented whom. We couldn't figure it out. Because we had these conflicting documents from different entities saying so-and-so represented this person, so-and-so represented this person, and we just couldn't get to the

bottom of it. And that's -- we filed many letters, they are on ECF, to the Court, asking for help. Because it just didn't line up. It didn't match. And the concern, as we articulated to Judge Levy, was that there was an effort on the part of an alleged perpetrator to prevent a victim from sharing information from the government. And that was sort of underlying the issue with the CONMEBOL search.

The government through the government of Paraguay did a search on CONMEBOL, but then, also, the entity CONMEBOL was trying to cooperate with the government and wanted to give us stuff and --

THE COURT: Mr. Napout --

MS. MACE: -- Defendant Napout was saying that the victim could not give that stuff to the government.

THE COURT: Right. CONMEBOL, as victim, could not give that information to the government.

MS. MACE: Correct.

THE COURT: Yes, I understand all that.

So, in essence, though, that process relating simply to the CONMEBOL documents started in January 2016, and only after a fair amount of briefing, discussions between the parties, namely Napout's attorneys and the government, and a hearing that Judge Levy thought was necessary to sort out the claim of common interest privilege, that process basically went from January 2016 to March of this year.

MS. MACE: That's right, Your Honor, and I guess -on a happy note, I can tell you just an update on that, that
we hopefully have reached the end of that saga or near the
end. We have been speaking with counsel for Napout and
counsel for CONMEBOL, and come up with an agreed approach to
how to do that privilege review, and we have already begun
running the numbers to see what would be involved, how many
hits on lawyer's names and so forth. And it looks like it is
going to be a manageable size of documents. So --

THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, though. Had Mr. Napout's attorneys not asserted some kind of privilege as to the CONMEBOL documents, you would have disclosed them to the parties back in January 2016 or thereabout?

MS. MACE: Shortly thereafter. There was a gap of time between the actual seizure in Paraguay and when they showed up on our doorstep. There was --

THE COURT: In transit.

MS. MACE: In transit. And that was not immediate. I don't remember the date right now when we actually received them, but it would have been early spring that we received them. And then we could have processed those right away. As I said, CONMEBOL was cooperative and willing to participate in that privilege review immediately, so that we could get those things out the door. And as I said, it looks like it is a very small number of documents at issue that need to be

71 1 reviewed. 2 And so the rest, that 350,000 or so documents, most 3 of those we're preparing right now to send over to the 4 defense. 5 THE COURT: They haven't received them yet. 6 MS. MACE: They haven't received them because it is 7 just now that we got the ruling from Judge Levy, and that we 8 reached an agreement with defense counsel as to how to conduct 9 that privilege review. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Great. Anything else on speedy 11 trial? 12 No, I don't think so, Your Honor. MS. MACE: 13 THE COURT: All right. 14 MR. PAPPALARDO: Your Honor, may I? 15 THE COURT: Yes. I assumed you would. 16 MR. PAPPALARDO: Just one point, Your Honor. 17 It is one thing -- we oppose the scheduling order. 18 We objected to the scheduling order. 19 THE COURT: Let me back up. The reason I asked the 20 government those questions about the CONMEBOL documents is 21 that you cannot tell me that the time delay, if you will, 22 between January 2016 and March 10, 2017, at a minimum, was due 23 to the fact that you wanted to assert a privilege as to the 24 CONMEBOL documents. Now, you may take issue with how long 25 that process took, but my understanding from the government,

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and I take the representation at face value, was that in the beginning it was an iterative process between defense counsel and the government, that the government claims that in some way they were misinformed as to some of the attorneys who may have represented Mr. Napout before, and that that had to be sorted out as a rather complicated situation, factually as well as legally, before Judge Levy or with Judge Levy's intercession, and Judge Levy believed it required a hearing. And based on what I have read of the decision and the hearing, I agree that that was the sensible course, for your client, to give him the fullest benefit of any argument you wanted to make about a claim of suppression of these documents. And so I just don't understand how you can argue that that time shouldn't have stopped on that clock. Period. MR. PAPPALARDO: I will let Ms. Piñera-Vazguez address that because she was involved. One thing I wish to point out for the record, Your Honor, is that there was a moving target. There was an answer to a question, which then the question changed. Ms. Piñera-Vazquez sent a letter in. She was answering a different question than the subsequent question that was raised. There was some --THE COURT: Misunderstanding. MR. PAPPALARDO: -- confusion. We have no -- and

the other thing, Your Honor, that makes this kind of silly is

73 that the government has been in possession of probably, I 1 2 don't know this, but probably 95 percent of the materials that 3 they seized from CONMEBOL in a search on January 1. They were 4 already in possession of that information because they received it from McDermott, who represented CONMEBOL in the 5 late fall of 2015. 6 7 But the whole point, Your Honor, we don't care about 8 those documents. The bottom line is this --THE COURT: 9 But you must have. You moved to prevent 10 the government from turning them over to everyone. 11 MR. PAPPALARDO: We simply pointed out that there 12 was -- we believe that there was a common interest privilege 13 with regard to commercial transactions. And then CONMEBOL 14 didn't waive commercial transactions. So that was the end of the discussion as far as we were concerned. 15 16 THE COURT: I don't think that's accurate. 17 that there's an agreement that there is a common interest as 18 to commercial transactions, but that doesn't get to the 19 document or the issue here. 20 MR. PAPPALARDO: That was the only common interest 21

privilege that we asserted, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I don't think that's accurate.

MR. PAPPALARDO: It is, Your Honor. That's 100 percent accurate.

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THE COURT: Well, maybe it's the scope, then, of how

you interpret commercial interest. Because what ended up happening is we had a fierce battle with the government over whether or not your client could tell CONMEBOL they couldn't release certain documents that may relate to his possible complicity in a scheme to -- a bribery scheme that hurt, so goes the argument, CONMEBOL's interest. And that's where I think the fight was. Maybe that's an interpretation --

MR. PAPPALARDO: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: -- of what it means to have a common interest over commercial transactions, but I believe it was outside of that commercial transaction common interest that the fight was. Am I misinterpreting that?

MR. PAPPALARDO: If I may, Your Honor, we don't -our interests are not -- we don't -- we are not here to assert
CONMEBOL's interest. We didn't do that before. We only
raised the common interest privilege as it related to
commercial transactions, which we defined as interactions when
Napout was president of CONMEBOL to get contracts that were
already outstanding, paid, and things of that nature. Once
that was not subject to the waiver anymore, after the broad
waiver was carved out to exclude commercial transactions, that
ended it as far as my interests were concerned. The only -the only problem that surfaced is that Mr. Burt was determined
to be representing CONMEBOL and Mr. Napout at the same time.
That's why we are not sorting out, you know, does the

privilege -- is this communication subject to a Napout privilege or is it a CONMEBOL privilege. And that's what we're sorting out now.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. MACE: Your Honor, I don't think we need to re-argue that whole issue. I do want to make one clarification because this is significant, I think, in the context of the speedy trial argument. As I said, as Mr. Pappalardo just said, now that the government was a moving target somehow. And what we did is we asked for a list of defense counsel. And what we got back on July 7 is a letter that said among others, Alfredo Montanaro represented Mr. Napout.

There's no moving target here. It's not about what you're searching or what the issue is. They said that the general counsel of CONMEBOL represented Napout. And now, I happen to know from the list of searches, that there are several documents, hundreds of documents, that -- with Mr. Alfredo Montanaro's name on it in the CONMEBOL documents, and so when they say we could have turned them over before, we couldn't do that proper privilege review without an accurate list of who the lawyers were.

So we had to get to the bottom of it. We've done that now, we are now moving quickly to be able to turn that stuff over. But it is just not accurate to say that we could

76 have done it before when we didn't have accurate information. 1 2 MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Your Honor, may I? 3 THE COURT: Yes. Speedy trial. 4 MS. PINERA-VAZQUEZ: Just as to speedy trial, to get back on track, Your Honor. There's a couple of inaccuracies 5 that I would like to correct that Ms. Mace said before we 6 7 go --8 THE COURT: Wait, wait. Slow. 9 MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Silvia Piñera on behalf of Juan 10 Napout. Your Honor, first of all, I would like to clarify 11 12 for the record, when Mr. Napout was arrested on December 3 in 13 Zurich, I was in Miami, and I immediately contacted Ms. Mace 14 and alerted her that the electronic devices that they seized off my client potentially contained attorney-client privilege 15 16 information. So that was the first time that we communicated 17 that to the government. 18 A month later was the raid in CONMEBOL, where they 19 seized all these documents, January 1, 2016. By that time, 20 our client was already here in the United States, had asserted 21 his -- and requested a speedy trial, having waived extradition 22 from Switzerland. And, in fact, we even objected to the

since that day, we have continually objected to any further

definition of the discovery and the indictment. And, in fact,

complex designation, even though I understand the Court's

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delay and requested a speedy trial.

Now, the government waited until July 26, seven months later, to deal with this alleged privilege issue. In other words, they didn't call me or call Mr. Pappalardo and say, "Hey, we understand that there are these documents, let's begin the process. Are we going to do a taint team, are we going to do a Chinese wall with privilege?" You know, there's 20 million names for it now.

No. They waited seven months. They decided the time frame, despite the fact that Mr. Napout had from December 3 asserted an attorney-client privilege on all these documents, which would extend to a certain extent to the CONMEBOL documents. They decided.

Now, there's an allegation that Ms. Mace made that there was some sort of -- the inference is that we -- we, meaning Mr. Napout's lawyers, tried to sort of extend or broaden the amount of lawyers that represented Mr. Napout to trick the government. That's not the case, Your Honor. We were asked a very broad question, and we responded, as we should, as all the lawyers that we knew to have represented Mr. Napout. That is now withered down, based on the narrowing of the issues.

THE COURT: But let me ask you, though. I am not assuming any kind of trickery involved, but the simple fact that you named a number of lawyers, doesn't that support the

government's argument and address your own argument that it took some time for the government to try to sort that out on their own before coming to you in July of 2016 to figure this out?

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Well, they waited seven months to address an issue that we had been requesting for seven months be addressed. We can't force them. We can't force them, "You have to do this." I mean, we actually even met with them at one point and said, "Can we go forward with this?" We basically begged, "Let's get this over with. My client wants a speedy trial. He wants to resolve this. He wants to go back to Asunción and live his life." I mean, he's been here for two years almost, Your Honor. And it dragged on further. There's nothing else we could do. I mean, we did the most we could to preserve our client's right to a speedy trial.

Now, I agree with Ms. Mace, it's been sort of sorted out, and we are proceeding now with a taint team. So I don't want to deal with the privilege issue any more because I think that's -- I just wanted to stress the point as far as speedy trial is concerned.

The other factual disagreement I have with Ms. Mace is that she made a statement where apparently -- or gave the inference, and I think I heard it right, that somehow either Mr. Napout or his attorneys tried to convince a witness to not

turn over certain documents. That is not true. I believe that she mentioned Alfredo Montanaro.

THE COURT: Well, that's the argument. The argument is you were saying that because of the common interest privilege, this is the legal argument, Mr. Napout would have say in whether or not the documents that CONMEBOL might have wanted to turn over to the government could be turned over or not. In other words, he could assert a common interest privilege and say, no, those won't be turned over. That's what you wanted, right?

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: The problem is, that call was never made. That influence was never exerted on any witness by Mr. Napout or his lawyers.

THE COURT: So that's a legal argument you were making. That was the whole point of the motion, right, is to assert that common interest privilege so that Mr. Napout could have a say about whether CONMEBOL documents were turned over to the government.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Well, two things. First of all, it's CONMEBOL's privilege. But, more importantly, the inference given was that Mr. Napout was trying to exert illegal influence over a witness that had to turn over documents that supposedly may harm him down the road, which simply did not happen. I don't want that to be left on the record because that could be the basis of what they will claim

down the road is either obstruction of justice or tampering with witnesses. I want to be very clear, for the record, that at no point has anybody tried to exert any witness at CONMEBOL because that was a statement that was made.

THE COURT: Let me pause here for a moment. Whether that comes in or not, I am not deciding that today. If the government has evidence of some effort to obstruct justice, you will both make your arguments about whether it is legitimate evidence or not. But it doesn't affect the speedy trial issue, one way or the other.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: So, basically, Your Honor, the bottom line with the speedy trial is that our client has done everything he can to exert that right. We had no control over the government's schedule, and I understand the Court set the schedule for the briefing. And we did object to the briefing. That's why we filed our speedy trial motion on October -- early, before the Court required, and then they responded when they had to. But there's nothing else that we could have done to --

THE COURT: But what's the prejudice?

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Two years in the United States, living under 24/7 security, not being able to work.

Your Honor, these are legitimate concerns. He's here alone in this country. Yes, his family can come and go, but he has a business that he's supposed to be running that he can't run.

He doesn't have unlimited resources like the government that can spend four years investigating a case, two years waiting for it to go to trial. I mean, when I was a prosecutor in the Southern District of Florida, we were taught very clearly: You do your investigation. The day you indict the case, you get ready to try it within the speedy trial, and you turn over all the discovery. And if you don't -- and it doesn't matter how complex it was, you were ready to go to trial.

Certainly, that's not the case here, Your Honor.

What happened? I mean, it is two years down the road. The prejudice -- he's sitting here, not being able to live his life. And he's in custody. And he's -- there's no money. It is running out.

And then the other thing, Judge, is discovery. I mean, which is another issue, which I can talk about it now, but when is it going to be cut off? I mean, motions are due in a month. I just got a dump of discovery on Monday of information that they had years ago. I mean, I don't understand. Is there going to be a cutoff date? Are we going to keep getting this rolling discovery or --

THE COURT: I think whatever evidence the government has that might be introduced at trial, they should turn over as soon as they get it. I don't think the complaint should be that they are giving you too much information. If you get it too late in relation to the trial, or in relation to being

able to make a motion to suppress or something else, that's a legitimate argument. But then continuing to follow their obligation to turn over discovery as they get it, I am not going to fault them for that. Now --

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: We want all the *Brady*. We want all the *Brady*. For sure we want all the *Brady*. Yeah, we got all the *Brady*, but we keep getting information that affects the speedy trial. We can't effectively be prepared -- I mean, the bottom line is, there has to be a cutoff date so we know what we're able to investigate. We have to do our investigation. We have actually affirmative defenses that we are going to put on. So we have to do our investigation on the discovery that they give us. How on earth can we do that if the --

THE COURT: It's not going to affect speedy trial. I mean, bear in mind, we have a trial date, which I thought was the most curious part of your brief. You kept suggesting that somehow there isn't going to be a trial on a date certain. We have a date certain to start trial. That will happen. The government has even acknowledged that if new defendants come in between now and trial, it is likely that they will have to be severed. I think we can all agree on that.

In terms of evidence coming in, if you think there's some unfairness brought by having received information late,

you should absolutely make that argument. But I am not moving the trial date. We have a trial date. So to the extent that you're arguing speedy trial, what you are talking about is the time from now, and, quite frankly, when I resolve the motion on the motion to dismiss -- I'm sorry, the motion for severance, until we get to trial, your only argument, in my opinion, is that you were somehow required to brief certain issues at the same time as other defendants. There's just not much percentage in that argument because we have a case that involves multiple defendants. It would make no sense for me to actually give everybody a separate deadline and require the government to respond multiple times, especially when the argument, as here, is really one sort of type of argument, namely, prejudicial spillover, et cetera, et cetera.

But I hear what your argument is. I just have to tell you, I don't accept it. And, also, I think there's so many, as I mentioned before, different statutory ways in which it was entirely proper to stop the running of the speedy trial clock to exclude the time for some reasonable period to allow other defendants to be brought in. Mr. Burga, I guess, would be an example of someone who entered in at some point.

But, more importantly, to give your client ample opportunity, which he has used quite readily to make all of the arguments that you think are appropriate in his defense. Everything from motions -- a motion to dismiss to the

discovery motion over the privilege, to the severance motion and beyond. We have some more motions to get through before we get to trial. And unless you want me to not allow you to do that, there's really no argument to be made that this is moving too slowly or in a way that prejudices your client in some respect that the case law recognizes, as opposed to the inconvenience it's brought on his life.

I am not minimizing that. I am sure it is quite expensive for him to maintain a luxury apartment in Miami with his whole family there.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Actually, Judge, it is not inconvenience. It is actually extremely prejudicial, and to sort of make it seem as if he's living in a luxury apartment with all his family and is not prejudicial is really wrong because he is in custody. He in custody. He is living in a foreign country. This is not his country. And he can't even work in his business. So I think that it is prejudicial. I mean, I don't think -- I wouldn't want to live in Paraguay for two years away from my family, no matter whether I was living in a presidential palace. I'd want to be at home with my family going to my daughter's kindergarten graduation and my son's first communion. I mean, it is prejudicial, Your Honor. And I think the bottom line here is -- and I will sit down because I think I have said too much.

There's a reason for speedy trial. There's no

question in this case the government was not ready to go to trial when we asked for a speedy trial. They were not ready to go to trial because we are still getting discovery today. Two years later. If my client would have been granted what he asked for, which was a speedy trial from the day he waived extradition from Switzerland, he would be home today. He would have been home several years ago.

This is not --

THE COURT: I cannot agree with anything you are saying because of the process your client himself has availed himself of. How much quicker could we have resolved four different motions from your client alone? You would ask us to fast track his entire trial ahead of everybody else, when you have interceded with four different motions. I mean, if anyone wants to complain, I imagine it might be the other defendants who are stuck with your client who wants to file every single motion.

And to the extent that there is late discovery, some of it is these CONMEBOL documents that your client has been fighting over letting the government produce or use.

So your argument, really, you are just the wrong purveyor of that argument. If there's a speedy trial motion to be made, I have to say, Mr. Napout is the last person for whom I think it is valid, given how much process, rightfully, as is his due right, has used, that has accounted for a huge

amount of the -- I am not even going to call it delay, but the amount of time the case has consumed.

This is an enormous case that has a lot of discovery, a lot of issues that have to be sorted out. We've tried to move it along as expeditiously as possible, while giving every defendant as much opportunity as they want to make whatever motions they think are appropriate. But, please.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: No. I think --

THE COURT: You can tell where I am coming from.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: We want our November 7 --

MR. PAPPALARDO: November 6.

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: -- hopefully we'll go to trial that day, November 6, and there'll be no --

THE COURT: Fear not. Subject to some, God forbid, nuclear attack, we are going forward on November 7. So you have your date certain for a trial. The question is, will be, after I decide this motion, how many of the five defendants will go to trial or at least will be slated to go to trial.

MR. STILLMAN: Your Honor, I have a less emotionally charged comment. And that is, Ms. Mace refers to a 403 motion. Now, most of the time I have seen 403, it's during trial, "Object, 403."

Now, do I understand the government's saying we are going to tee up the 403 issue in advance of trial?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. MACE: Yes, Your Honor. And, typically, we style it as an other acts motion. Sometimes it's referred to as a 404(b) motion. In a racketeering context it's not typically 404(b) evidence because it is evidence of the racketeering enterprise. And so it is typically our practice, and we propose doing it in this case, to brief for the Court what is outside of the conduct of the defendants who are going to trial so that defense can object and say "We think that should be excluded under 403" or any other basis.

THE COURT: I think that's a very prudent alternative avenue we should pursue here because there will be, to be sure, some argument, I imagine, about the other bad acts, I will call it, evidence, even though technically it is not.

MR. STILLMAN: Good to hear that, Your Honor. I just wonder if I can -- I know judges don't like cross questioning or talking.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. STILLMAN: When?

THE COURT: Yes. So that's a subject of discussion.

I actually get to decide when, or at least I have some --

MS. MACE: Vision? So we will leave it to

Your Honor. I think a date that would make sense, sort of
looking to when the -- counting back from the trial date, we

thought that 90 days before trial, or August 7, would allow time for briefing of that. If there are any defendants who are no longer in the case, that will sort of help this shake out as well, and that will allow time for resolution of that in enough time for trial that everyone can prepare appropriately.

THE COURT: Right.

What do you all think? 90 days?

MR. STILLMAN: In as much as I think -- we have a May date for the motions we have to make. Why can't we put all that together, and we will make our motions by May 8, and let the government makes theirs, and get all these things teed up, and get ourselves organized for a nice November 10 trial.

THE COURT: What's our May 8 deadline? Suppression, or motions in limine, right?

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Any motions to the fact, to the discovery.

THE COURT: Any motion to the discovery, or the facts. Any factual --

MS. PIÑERA-VAZQUEZ: Motions to suppress, yeah.

THE COURT: I view these as different and, quite frankly -- I don't know. I mean, I think the concern on the government's part may be that it is a little early for you to know exactly what you are going to put on for the other acts evidence.

MS. MACE: Yes, Your Honor. And I think as trial prep continues, one of the things that we do is we narrow that evidence down to a smaller set of evidence, and, also, if there are other resolutions, that can change the landscape significantly. And so I found when we do it too far in advance, then you end up doing it twice. And so that's part of what motivates us, we want to leave enough time, and that's why we're thinking August. I think a little bit before that would be fine as well, but I think May is a little too early.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the question is, if we want to combine the briefing, maybe what we might do is move the suppressions motion until later, and still combine them with the other acts, because I do think there's a certain economy achieved by having one set of briefing.

So maybe we delay the motions to suppress by a month and a half or so, and get us into July, and we have everything done together in July. Does that sound workable?

MS. MACE: That would be fine with the government.

MR. STILLMAN: It's okay with us, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. They do have some crossover potentially. But let's try that.

But then the government is going to have to produce something in advance. Well, no, I guess you'll produce it at that time, and then the other side will respond.

MS. MACE: See our motion. So I think it --

90 THE COURT: Sort of cross. 1 2 MS. MACE: -- perhaps it will work well, the 3 briefing schedule would be defense motions to suppress, on the 4 same day that we file our motion for --THE COURT: Other acts. 5 MS. MACE: -- to admit other acts, and then we'll 6 7 have cross reply times, and we won't be each briefing them at 8 the same time. 9 THE COURT: Perfect. 10 MR. STILLMAN: And nobody likes the summer anyway. 11 (Laughter.) 12 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Paulson? 13 MR. PAULSON: Judge, if I may --14 MR. STILLMAN: Sorry. I also wanted to -- maybe this is an appropriate time, Your Honor, to talk about the 15 16 Jencks and Giglio and things like that. THE COURT: You mean in terms of when the government 17 18 will turn it over? MR. STILLMAN: Yes, Your Honor. 19 20 THE COURT: Well, let's wait and see. One second. 21 Mr. Paulson, did you want to talk about this 22 briefing schedule we're proposing? 23 MR. PAULSON: Not the schedule so much, Your Honor, 24 but how the concept of the 403 motion and the other acts plays 25 into our severance argument.

THE COURT: Well, they will be separate. I am first going to decide the severance issue. However, I cannot say that the potential or the possibility of resolving some of these claims of prejudice, by way of looking carefully at the evidence that the government intends to produce on the RICO conspiracy won't affect my decision.

Because, practically speaking, I am looking forward -- ahead, rather, to what's the most efficient result. And to the extent that we can address some of the prejudice arguments that have been raised, there will be some consideration of the possibility, but not necessarily the resolution of those issues. So, in other words, you won't know how those will resolve, but the fact that we have this mechanism I think will play into my decision to some extent.

MR. PAULSON: My point, I guess, Your Honor, with respect to Mr. Trujillo in particular, there may be other acts that the government wants to introduce that are not part of these five schemes that are relevant to these defendants, but that might be relevant to the overall RICO conspiracy, to which we would not have -- to which we would not have objections insofar as they are introduced to prove the RICO conspiracy with respect to Mr. Trujillo. However, most of our prejudice arguments with respect to severance have nothing to do with the other acts, they have to do with --

THE COURT: These defendants.

MR. PAULSON: -- the CONMEBOL, Copa do Brasil, Copa Libertadores schemes, and how they relate to Mr. Trujillo.

THE COURT: I will specifically address your client's arguments in that context. Because as I said, there are sort of two aspects of the arguments that both sides -- that all defendants have made, the bigger RICO conspiracy evidence argument, and then the more specific argument vis-à-vis the other defendants who are going to trial. So I will address that.

MR. PAULSON: Thank you.

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THE COURT: The other thing I'll mention, although I'm a little afraid to do this, is that it is possible that when we get to this point of deciding what evidence might come in or not come in, based on a 403 analysis, that it might resuscitate an argument for severance, I can almost tell you probably not as to the CONMEBOL defendants, but possibly as to Mr. Takkas and Mr. Trujillo. Possibly. And so let's say you survive this round. I will say that if at that time you think it is worth reviving that argument, you can make your argument In other words, if I say, yes, the government at that time. gets to put in all of the evidence they want to establish either RICO conspiracy or obviously the evidence relating to the other defendants, I would permit you to try to re-argue your severance if you wanted to at this point, at least with respect to the two nonCONMEBOL defendants.

MR. PAULSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So we'll see. I shouldn't actually limit it to those two, but I won't necessarily reject it out of hand. Because I realize that some part of the calculus may have to do with how I make that determination about 403. This is called a 403 analysis, okay, when we specifically find out what the evidence is.

MS. MACE: Your Honor, just on that point, I think there's -- I don't know if this is important to make now, but on the 403 analysis, of course, it is defendant by defendant.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. MACE: And so we will be arguing in our motion what evidence can be admissible as to each defendant, and they should be considered individually. And so if the Court were to rule that the evidence is admissible and not unduly prejudicial as to Defendant Trujillo, then I don't think that would revive a motion for severance because that would be a ruling that the evidence could come in even in a trial of just Mr. Trujillo.

THE COURT: Right. You would say it would defeat it, in effect.

MS. MACE: Yes. And if the Court were to find that it is unduly prejudicial, there could be two results. I suppose one would be that it would be excluded altogether, or excluded as to one defendant with a limiting instruction. But

if the Court were to rule that it is admissible, I don't think that that would then trigger a new severance motion.

THE COURT: It would be inconsistent. I understand what you're saying. And I think that's a fair point. You know, let's table that for now. Let's see what happens when we get to the actual point of seeing this 403 evidence and how that all shakes out.

Ms. Mace is probably right, that in order to make the assessment that it is admissible, it probably subsumes the argument that an individual defendant could be severed on that basis. But I am just sort of thinking about -- thinking a little bit how this is all going to work out.

So at this point I am not going to make a determination either way. It is something for the defense, obviously, to think about, not that I need to give you any ideas. I am sure you would have thought of this on your own. And the government would obviously respond that that would be inappropriate, having made a finding that all of that potential 403 evidence still comes in.

So let's -- the other question you asked,

Mr. Stillman, was about *Giglio* and *Jencks*, right? So we have
a trial date of November 7. I would think at least a month in
advance, four weeks in advance. This is a pretty -- this is
going to be a lot of evidence, right?

MS. MACE: There is. And I think, generally

speaking, that is appropriate. We would like to have an opportunity to propose to the Court something a little bit more detailed because there are some witnesses who are particularly sensitive that will have to travel, and when they are -- that we would not want to disclose certain things while they are outside of the United States and so forth.

And so we would like to be specific with regard to each witness. There are certain witnesses we can provide well in advance, and others that we will want to do closer in time to their testimony. So we would like to propose to the Court something detailed --

THE COURT: That's fine. But in terms of the information or witnesses as to whom there might not be any special circumstances, how much time would you be willing to turn that over or can you turn that over?

MS. MACE: I mean, certainly, a month before jury selection, we can commit to now, and maybe even earlier for some witnesses.

THE COURT: Right. I am wondering, six weeks for the nonspecial stuff, and then we can discuss the schedule for the other. Because --

MR. UDOLF: Judge, may I interrupt?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. UDOLF: Is that as to Giglio and Jencks?

THE COURT: Yes. I believe so, right? Because the

concern, I think, is identifying who the person is. The witnesses as to whom there's some sensitivity.

MR. UDOLF: Not the substance of what they say, just the identity in general?

THE COURT: No, the substance of what they say, I guess.

MS. MACE: Well, I mean, that's the issue, that sometimes there is some very sensitive information that's sensitive in and of itself and also some that makes it very clear who the witness is or where they are and so forth.

And so we intend to get it to the defense in enough time to prepare some of those sensitive witnesses. We will have very small amounts of material that goes with them. But as I said, we can propose something earlier to the Court that's detailed, but we just don't want to commit now to early disclosure of those sensitive witnesses.

THE COURT: What I propose is that for anything as to which there's no special circumstance, if you could provide that to the defense six weeks in advance, then certainly they can spend a considerable amount of time digesting all the nonspecial information, which will, to my mind, blunt an argument that they don't have enough time to consider the much smaller group of Jencks and *Giglio* relating to the more sensitive witnesses. That would actually go a long way in terms of my willingness to give you more time to -- more delay

in terms of turning it over for reasons that you will have to provide justifying that.

So that's my proposal. So six weeks before the trial date. Let me turn to my trusty deputy, who has to do all these calculations.

And just so you know, we will recapitulate all these deadlines in the docket order, in case you're not taking copious notes.

THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: September 25.

THE COURT: September 25, for the government to turn over *Jencks*, *Giglio*, relating to any witness as to whom they are not making a special application. And I will urge the government to turn over redacted copies of whatever you can, even as to those witnesses you are concerned about, if you can do so in a way that you think is consistent with whatever security or other issues you have. Okay?

MS. MACE: Understood, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. And then you will at the same time when you make that -- when you turn that over, submit whatever application you want as to the other witnesses, but do that ex parte, in camera, so that I can see those. And, obviously, file notice that you're submitting it ex parte and in camera so the defense knows that has happened. And I will analyze those separately.

MS. MACE: Understood. Thank you.

98 1 THE COURT: All right. Does that satisfy your 2 question, Mr. Stillman? 3 MR. STILLMAN: It does, Your Honor. Thank you. 4 THE COURT: All right. Anything else from anyone else about anything else? 5 MR. UDOLF: Judge, I have one issue. We have never 6 7 set a briefing schedule for Mr. Burga, and he just came into 8 court in December of this past year. And, you know, we were 9 not able to get in on the deadline for the motion to dismiss. 10 And then, unfortunately, I was taken sick and was out of commission for two months. I have been in discussions with 11 12 counsel for the government, and they have no objection to 13 giving us three weeks, file anything that might be relevant to 14 a motion to dismiss, provided they have three weeks to respond. 15 16 THE COURT: That's fine. Obviously, taking into 17 account what I have already written on the topic, based on the 18 motions filed by Mr. Marin and Mr. Napout, right? 19 MR. UDOLF: Right. To the extent it is duplicative, 20 we would incorporate their arguments. 21 THE COURT: Just to preserve it. 22 MR. UDOLF: Right. Just to preserve the issue. 23 there are some issues that may be unique to Mr. Burga, so. 24 THE COURT: Right. I think you alluded to one. 25 That's fine.

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              Is the government in agreement, as Mr. Udolf says?
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              MS. MACE:
                         Yes.
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              MR. NITZE:
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. So three weeks from now, which
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    is --
              THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: April 27.
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              THE COURT: -- April 27, you will file something on
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    behalf of Mr. Burga.
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              And then three weeks after that --
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              THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: May 18.
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              THE COURT: -- the government will file its
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    response.
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              And then two weeks after that for reply.
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              THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: June 1.
              THE COURT: All right.
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                          Just on speedy trial, Your Honor. As
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              MR. NITZE:
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    you noted, there are a number of bases on which the clock has
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    stopped, but we would ask that Your Honor continue the
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    designation of the case as complex, in our view, it is not a
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    close call, and exclude, in addition to the other bases, in
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    the interest of justice, on that ground.
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              THE COURT: Yes. I absolutely will.
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              I certainly have found more than once that this is a
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    complex case. And, certainly, that finding I think is
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    supported by the defendants' own submissions relating to the
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100 scope of this case and the amount of evidence that has to be 1 2 digested and reviewed. 3 In addition, we still have pending motions. 4 Obviously, Mr. Burga has entered, and he's got a motion to dismiss that will be pending, and then we will have more 5 motion practice relating to the 403. So for under a number of 6 7 reasons under 3161(h), I am going to toll the time until we 8 get to trial, because I know we will have motions all the way 9 up to trial. 10 All right. Obviously, you've preserved your speedy trial motion. 11 12 MR. PAPPALARDO: Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Thank you, everyone. Good seeing you 14 all again. 15 (WHEREUPON, at 12:25 p.m., the proceedings were 16 concluded.) 17 18 19 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 20 I, ANNETTE M. MONTALVO, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript 21 of my stenographic notes and is a full, true and complete 22 transcript of the proceedings to the best of my ability. 23 Dated this 14th day of April, 2017. 24 /s/Annette M. Montalvo Annette M. Montalvo, CSR, RDR, CRR Official Court Reporter 25